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portions can be identified. Most importantly, the self -recovery result is very competitive.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Transmission of digital images across networks has become
very popular due to the rapid development of Internet
and computer technologies. However, tampering with digital
images is easy to get, since modern pervasive and pow-
erful image manipulation tools have made imperceptible
modification of images very easy. Therefore, protecting
the ownership and integrity of images is an important
issue. Digital watermarking is a technique for inserting
information (the watermark) into an image, which can
be later extracted or detected for a variety of purposes,
including identification and/or authentication. For copyright
protection, robustness is a major concern; that is, even
if the watermarked image is processed by some common
image processing operations, the extracted watermark (e.g.,
a copyright logo) should be free from big distortion, so
that it is still recognizable. A watermark embedded for this
purpose is called a robust watermark [1]. Conversely, in
contrast to copyright protection, a watermark embedded
for content authentication should be fragile; that is, the
extracted watermark might be severely deformed even if the
watermarked image is tampered only slightly. This is because
the basic requirement for authentication is just one simple
thing; that is, if the already watermarked image (or image
area) is modified later, then the mismatch of the extracted
watermark can reflect this simple fact (that the already
watermarked image (or image area) has been altered further)
[2]. Hence, a watermark for authentication is classified as a
fragile watermark. This study designs a method for fragile
digital watermarking in order to verify the integrity of the
contents of a digital image.
Image authentication is divided into two common
approaches, digital-signature-based and watermarking-
based [3]. A digital-signature-based scheme [2, 4–6] stores
a so-called digital signature as the second file. The digital
signature is a set of important features extracted from
the original image and can be used for authentication.
The digital signature approach can tolerate some slight
manipulations of the original image unless the important
features of the original image are changed. However, the
separation of the authentication data from the images
may increase management overhead for transmission
and storage. Additionally, the digital signature usually
does not locate where the image is tampered and thus is
not directly applicable to image recovery. Unlike digital-
signature-based authentication schemes [2, 4–6] which
store the authentication data separately from the image,
watermarking-based authentication schemes [7–14]
embed the authentication data (watermark) directly into
the original image. The direct embedding reduces the
overhead caused by storing a separate file (digital signature),
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thus facilitating transmission. However, the embedded
watermark is usually very sensitive to any manipulation to
the watermarked image.
Many watermarking-based schemes can identify the
image areas that have been tampered or manipulated by
checking the presence and integrity of the local fragile
watermarks. For instance, Wong [11] proposed a block-
based authentication method. A hash function and XOR
operations are applied to each block to create a corre-
sponding watermarked block. Later in verification proce-
dure, the embedding watermark is extracted from the least
significant bits (LSBs) of the query image, decrypted using
a public key, and finally applied an XOR operation with
the hash value calculated from the query image block.
Due to the property of the hash function, any tampering
with a block generates an undesired binary output for
that block. This scheme elegantly integrates cryptography
with watermarking and works well in detecting cropping
attacks. However, because Wong’s approach [11] is block-
wise independent, it is vulnerable to the collage attack [15]
(also known as the “vector quantization” (VQ) attack [16]).
The attacker constructs a vector quantization codebook
with codewords taken directly from the blocks of a set
of watermarked images. The image to be counterfeited
is then approximated by this codebook. Since each block
is already authenticated by itself, the counterfeit image
appears authentic to the watermarking algorithm. To solve
this problem, Wong and Memon [12] proposed two more
input parameters to the hash function of Wong’s previous
method [11]. These new input parameters are the block
index k and the image identification number ID, both
of which increase the diﬃculty of performing a collage
attack. Their scheme not only makes the collage attack
infeasible, but also maintains the tampered area locating
ability of the original version. However, the issue of the
recovery of the tampered area is not yet provided in their
scheme.
Several detecting-locating (authentication) methods
with tamper recovery ability have recently been presented.
Lin et al. [9] proposed an attractive block-based digital
watermarking scheme for images’ tampering detection, loca-
tion, and recovery. They used parity check and comparison
to generate the authentication watermark of each block,
and then added the recovery information, which recorded
the six most significant bits (MSBs) of the mean value of
another block, to form the embedding watermark. Finally,
the embedding watermark was embedded using the simple
LSB substitution method. Their verification procedure uses
a four-layer hierarchical inspection system to increase the
accuracy of locating the tampered area. Although their
method can recover a tampered area by storing the mean
of each block in the LSBs of another block (the backup
block), it cannot recover a block if both this block and
its single backup block are tampered at the same time
(e.g., in a cropping attack of an extensive area). Hence, the
tampered-area recovery ability is not strong enough in some
situations. Luo et al. [10] proposed a pixel-wise and block-
wise complementary watermarking scheme based on digital
halftoning and inverse halftoning techniques. Their method
transforms the original image into its halftone version, which
is then treated as the watermark and embedded in the
original image using the simple LSB substitution method. In
tampering recovery, inverse halftoning is performed to repair
the tampered areas. Wu and Chang [13] developed a method
based on the JPEG compression technique. Their method
uses an edge detection technique to identify the edges of
the image before the JPEG compression, then embeds the
resulting edge characteristic into some AC coeﬃcients of
the frequency domain after the JPEG compression. If the
image is tampered, then the embedded edge characteristic
can be used to detect the tampered areas and cooperate
the interpolation method to reconstruct it. Wang and
Tsai [14] proposed a block-based digital watermarking
scheme for image authentication and recovery. Their method
selects the region of importance (ROI) in the image and
applies the fractal image coding for the blocks of ROI
to generate the recovery data. If the tampered area is
not the ROI, then damaged region is restored by image
inpainting.
This study proposes a competitive image authentication
and tampered-area recovery method. The authentication
data for each block are calculated using a cryptographic hash
function, in which the input includes the MSBs information
within the block, the user’s secret key, the block address
information, and some private information about the image.
The recovery data are VQ index value of the block, which
can be generated by any vector quantization (VQ) technique
(e.g., [17]). To increase the recovery ability, the VQ index
value is shared by Thien and Lin’s secret image sharing
method [18], which is reviewed briefly in the next section.
Finally, the recovery information is combined with the
authentication data to form the watermark. To improve
security, when a part of the watermark is embedded into
a block’s LSBs, the embedding locations of the bits are
arranged according to a pseudorandom permutation, based
on the Mersenne Twister (MT) pseudorandom number
generator [19]. Experimental results show that the quality of
the watermarked image is acceptable, and that the positions
of the tampered parts are located accurately. The recovery of
large-area corruption is also good.
In conclusion, the proposed method has the following
novelty compared with previously published schemes (par-
ticularly, image authentication or recovery methods [7–14]
and image sharing methods [18, 20–26]).
(i) The recovery data are generated by using VQ com-
pression technique (an index file). A VQ index file has at
least three advantages. (a) The matched codeword of an image
block is more suitable for showing the texture of the block than
the mean value or the halftone result, as used in some other
publications. (b) VQ compression technique is block based,
and a block-based approach is suﬃciently easy to apply for
tampering recovery. (c) VQ decompression is simple and has
a very short decoding time, thus reducing the reconstruction
cost.
(ii) To increase the survival rate of the recovery data (VQ
index file), a modified version of the (r, n) threshold sharing
[18] is used to generate n index shares. Some remarks about
this are given below.
Yu-Jie Chang et al. 3
(a) In earlier applications (reviewed in Section 2) of
secret sharing techniques to images, people shared a
secret image among n shadows and then transmitted
them to n participants. The secret image can be
revealed when any r of the n participants gather
together. However, the proposed method shares the
VQ index file of the host image to generate n index
shares and then embeds these n index shares into the
image itself, rather than transmitting the shares to
n users. In the recovery phase, the tampered area is
reconstructed by extracting any r authenticated VQ
index shares embedded earlier in the watermarked
image itself.
(b) When applying secret sharing techniques to images,
people often generate n shares for each pixel (or for
each block of the pixels) of the secret image. Hence,
the share value has a wide range, and each share is
represented by m bits, where m is the number of bits
per pixel. For example, if each pixel is represented
by 8 bits, then each share needs 8 bits. However, the
proposed method assumes that the codebook has L
codewords and divides each VQ index value into r
sections before generating n index shares for each
index value. Thus, the size of each index share is
reduced to (log2L)/r, which is usually smaller than
8 (e.g., (log2L)/r = 2 bits if (L = 1024, r = 5), or 3
bits if (L = 4096, r = 4)). The smaller size of each share
helps maintain the quality of the watermarked image
in the embedding process.
(c) All arithmetic calculations in the proposed method
are performed in the power-of-two Galois Field GF
2(log2L)/r), rather than the Mod251 used in many
previous image sharing. This modification not only
reduces the number of bits of each index share from
log2251 = 8 bits to (log2L)/r bits, but also makes
the proposed method more suitable for the various
codebook sizes L, thus increasing flexibility.
(iii) Many published image recovery techniques embed
the recovery data of a unit (i.e., a block or a pixel) for
backuping into another block or pixel according to a permu-
tation function. (Notably, having many copies of the recovery
data might increase survival rate, while decreasing the
quality of the watermarked image.) The proposed method
is sharing based, and each share is small in size. Hence,
unlike published recovery methods, the proposed method
allows many backup shares (n shares) without significantly
increasing the total size of recovery data. Since the proposed
method has more backup pieces (n shares rather than 1 or
2 copies), it can use a hybrid two-layer strategy to scatter
the backup (the n index shares created to backup a VQ
index value). More specifically, the host image is divided into
at least (n + 1) nonoverlapping regions, and the n index
shares of each block are, respectively, embedded into the
blocks of n other regions. After this layer of n-to- n random
mapping, the position of the corresponding block in each
region can be randomized again in the second layer and be
distinct among regions by an MT pseudorandom number
generator [19]. With this strategy, the recovery data can be
uniformly scattered (in a distributed and missing-allowable
manner) in the whole host image to resist a cropping attack
of an extensive area.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
briefly reviews the secret sharing method. The encoding
(watermarking) and decoding (detection, locating, and
recovery) of the proposed method are described in Sections
3 and 4, respectively. Experimental results are presented in
Section 5. The discussion and comparison are in Section 6,
and the summary is in Section 7.
2. A REVIEW OF SECRET SHARING METHODS
The concept of secret sharing was introduced independently
by Shamir [20] and Blakley [21]. Their (r, n) threshold
scheme divides the secret data into n shares. If any r of
these shares are available (r is a predefined number and
2 ≤ r ≤ n), then the secret data can be reconstructed, but
fewer than r shares cannot. One major advantage of secret
sharing is fault tolerant, because it allows n-r shares to be
absent due to network delay problem or storage damage.
Consequently, the survival rate of secret data increases.
Several secret sharing methods based on an (r, n) threshold
scheme have been proposed [18, 22–26]. Chang and Hwang
[22] applied the VQ technique [17] to encode the secret
image. Their method shares the generated codebook for
reconstructing the secret image among the n participants
by applying the (r, n) threshold scheme. Thien and Lin
[18] proposed a secret image sharing scheme. Their (r, n)
threshold scheme shares a secret image among n participants,
and each participant holds a generated shadow image whose
size is only 1/r of that of the secret image. The secret image
can be reconstructed if at least r of the n shadow images are
received. Thus, their method is also fault tolerant, because
n-r shadow images can be lost during the reconstruction.
The smaller size of their shadow images (1/r times the size
of the shadow images of ordinary sharing methods) is an
advantage in the transmission and storage. They further
developed a scheme [23] in which the shadow images
look like portraits of the original secret image and thus
provide a user-friendly interface to facilitate the management
of the shadow images. Lin and Tsai [24] integrated the
(r, n) threshold scheme with watermarking, thus ensuring
that each share has authentication capability to verify its
integrity before reconstructing the secret image. Wang and
Shyu [26] presented a scalable secret image sharing scheme
with three sharing modes, (1) multisecrets, (2) priority,
and (3) progressive, to increase the potential application
for secret image sharing. Unlike the aforementioned spatial-
domain methods, Lin and Tsai [25] proposed a method that
transforms the secret image into the frequency domain then
applies a sequence of random numbers to record the lower
frequency coeﬃcients (the AC values) except the DC value.
The DC value of each block is regarded as the secret key
and is shared among the n participants by applying the (r, n)
threshold scheme.
Because the proposed method utilizes the sharing poly-
nomial of Thien and Lin’s method [18], their work is
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reviewed below. In [18], a secret image O containing m pixels
is shared by n participants based on Shamir’s polynomial
(r, n)-threshold scheme [20] with a module base p = 251.
The image O is first transformed into a noisy image Q
by permuting pixels according to a secret key. Then, Q is
further divided into m/r nonoverlapping sections so that
each section contains r pixels. Let q(x) be the xth shadow
image, and let qj(x) be the jth pixel in q(x), where 1 ≤ x ≤ n
and 1 ≤ j ≤ m/r. For each section j, the r coeﬃcients
a0, a1, . . . , ar−1 of the corresponding polynomial
qj(x) = a0 + a1 × x + · · · + ar−1 × xr−1(mod p) (1)
are used as the gray values of the r pixels of the corresponding
section j in Q. The xth shadow image q(x) is the collection
{qj(x) | j = 1, 2, . . . ,m/r}. Since each section j, which has
r pixels, contributes only one pixel qj(x) to the xth shadow
image, the size of each generated shadow image is only 1/r
of that of the secret image O. This property holds for every
shadow image, that is, for every x ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . ,n}. Any r of
the n shadow images can be utilized to reconstruct Q because
the inverse finding of the r coeﬃcients a0, a1, . . . , ar−1 in (1)
only needs r of the n values {qj(1), qj(2), . . . , qj(n)}. The
detail is omitted.
To enhance the recovery ability of tampered image, the
proposed method employs the polynomial sharing equation
(1) to share the information needed for recovery. This
procedure is described in detail in Section 3.1. Notably,
Thien and Lin’s method [18] uses p = 251, but this study uses
p = 2(log2L)/r, where L is the VQ codebook size. Additionally,
all arithmetic calculations in the proposed method are
performed in the power-of-two Galois Field GF(2(log2L)/r),
thus reducing the number of bits needed to express a share
value (the left hand side of (1)) from log2251 = 8 bits to
(log2L)/r bits.
3. THE PROPOSED METHOD (ENCODING)
Figure 1(a) shows the flowchart of the encoding (watermark-
ing) procedure, while Figure 1(b) illustrates the decoding
(verification and recovery) procedure. Section 3 explains
Figure 1(a) only.
The encoding procedure consists of the following three
parts. (i) The input 8-bit grayscale image is first encoded
by VQ compression technique [17] to generate a VQ index
file of the image. The VQ index file of the image is then
shared by Thien and Lin’s method [18] (see (1)) to generate
n shares. These index shares are treated as the recovery
data. (ii) Next, the authentication data for each image
block are generated using a cryptographic hash function,
in which the input includes the local information of the
image block, and the interrelated information (about the
image) to resist the collage attack. (iii) Finally, the recovery
data of other blocks are combined with the authentication
data to form the watermark for the block. The watermark
is embedded in the LSBs of the block in the image. The
position of the so-called “other block” may be determined by
a permutation method based on the Mersenne Twister (MT)
pseudorandom number generator [19].
The details of the encoding are described in the following
three subsections accordingly.
3.1. Generation of the recovery data
The image recovery data are generated first. To do this, the
image is partitioned into nonoverlapping blocks of h × w
pixels each, where h is the block height, and w is the block
width. Each block of the image is then represented by an
index value according to a given codebook of size L (i.e.,
the number of codewords in the codebook is L). Therefore,
the compression result of the image is an index file. The
index value of each image block can be used as the recovery
information when the block is tampered.
To increase the survival rate in the recovery process,
Thien and Lin’s sharing method [18] is utilized to share
the index file of the VQ compressed image, as described
below. The index file in a sequence of index value by index
value (or equivalently, block by block ) is shared according
to the raster-scan order of the image, which is from left to
right and top to bottom. Each index value is transformed
into a binary stream of log2L bits, and this binary stream
is then divided into r sections. Therefore, each section has
log2L/r bits, where L is the codebook size, and · denotes
the ceiling operation. Each section of the binary stream is
then transformed into a decimal number, and these r decimal
numbers of an index value are assigned as the r coeﬃcients in
(1). By substituting n distinct values for the variable x in (1),
n shares can be generated. In other words, the index value
of an image block is shared among n index shares. Notably,
while Thien and Lin [18] used p = 251, as stated at the
end of Section 2, the proposed method uses p = 2(log2L)/r
and performs all arithmetic calculations in the power-of-two
Galois Field GF(2(log2L)/r). This change reduces the number
of bits needed to express a share value (the left hand side of
(1)) from log2251 = 8 bits to (log2L)/r bits. Additionally,
the bit length of each share value (which has (log2L)/r bits)
is only about 1/r of that of an index value (which has log2L
bits).
Since the (r, n) threshold scheme is used to share an index
value among n shares, the index value can still be recovered
even if (up to) n-r shares are lost. This increases the survival
rate (the recovery ability) of a tampered block if the n shares
of the tampered block are stored in n distinct places of the
image in advance. Moreover, because the bit length of each
share value is only 1/r of that of the index value, it is easy to
embed such a compact share value in the watermark.
Here we explain more clearly how (r, n) sharing and
uniform scattering increase the survival rate (the recovery
ability) of a tampered block. Notably, the proposed method
uses VQ index as the recovery data. For an image block,
the matched codeword is more informative to show the
texture of the block than the mean value or the halftone
result used in some other publications. Although the size of
a VQ index might be larger than that of the mean value or
the halftone representation of the block, we will use (r, n)
sharing to shorten it. (Each share is 1/r times the length of the
VQ index being shared.) Hence, unlike published recovery
methods, the proposed method allows many backup shares





















































Figure 1: Two flowcharts show the proposed method: (a) the encoding (watermarking) procedure, (b) the decoding (verification and
recovery) procedure.
(n shares) for each block without significantly increasing the
total size of recovery data. Since the proposed method has
more backup pieces (n shares rather than 1 or 2 copies), we
can use a hybrid two-layer strategy to scatter the backup (the
n created index shares) all over the image in a uniformly and
not-too-sparse manner. (This two-layer strategy is described
in detail in Section 3.3.) With this strategy, the recovery data
can be uniformly scattered throughout the whole image to
resist a cropping attack of an extensive area. Finally, since
the (r, n) sharing being used is a threshold system, if the
image is tampered in certain area, recovering a tampered
block A only requires that the remaining (nontampered)
areas contain at least r of the n scattered shares for A.
This missing allowable property (n-r shares can be missed),
together with the uniformly scattered distribution of the
n shares, increases the survival rate of the recovery data.
As for previous publications, they use a backup approach
to store the recovery data directly. In such approaches,
if a block and its single or double backup blocks are
tampered at the same time (e.g., in a cropping attack of an
extensive area), then the recovery data of this block is lost
completely.
3.2. Generation of the authentication data
After generating the recovery data, the next work is to gener-
ate the authentication data to verify the image’s integrity. The
authentication data of each block consists of some important
information about the block, including the MSBs of the
pixels within the block and the block’s position, as well as
some private information, such as the image owner’s secret
key, and the image identification number, width and length.
The watermark in the proposed scheme is hidden in the
t LSB planes of the image, and the remaining (8-t) MSBs
of each pixel within the block are used in the generation







< t < 8. (2)
This is because if each block has h × w pixels, then t LSB
planes together provide h × w × t bits to hide the recovery
data of n shares, of which each share has (log2L)/r bits. Of
course, the authentication data naturally occupies additional
bits. The number of additional bits should be added to the
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numerator of (2) if the “<t” in (2) is to be replaced by
“=t”. According to the decided parameter t, the image is
transformed into the t-LSB-zeroed image by setting all t LSBs
of each pixel in the image to zero. Notably, if the parameter
value of t is increased, then the hiding capacity of each block
(to embed recovery and authentication data) rises, leading
to stronger recovery and authentication ability. However, the
quality of the watermarked image worsens if the value of t
increases.
The t-LSB-zeroed image is used to generate the authen-
tication data for verification, as shown in Figure 1(a).
Consider a cryptographic hash function
H(S) = (d1,d2, . . . ,du), (3)
where S is an input bit string of arbitrary length; di is the
output binary bits of the hash function for 1 ≤ i ≤ u, and
u is the length of the output bit string. Wong and Memon
[12] concluded that a cryptographic hash function should
have the property that once an input bit string S and its
corresponding output (d1,d2, . . . ,du) are given, then finding
another input bit string of any length that will be hashed to
the same output (d1,d2, . . . ,du) should be computationally
infeasible. Commonly seen hash functions include the MD5
[27] and secure hash algorithm (SHA). For MD5, collision
attacks are computationally feasible on a standard desktop
computer [28], while SHA-1 attacks require heavier com-
putational power [29] (about 269 hash operations), making
attacks less feasible. Hence, the proposed method employs
SHA-1 as the hash function and produces a single output
160-bit message (the output hash value) from the input
message, that is, u = 160. Of course, other cryptographic hash
functions can also be used instead of SHA-1.
Let ID be the identification number of an image, and let
SK denote a secret key of the image owner. The SK can be
either constant or dynamic, where dynamic means changing
randomly or according to the image ID. Consider the kth
block of an image (k = 1, 2, . . . ,(Height × Width)/(h × w)
if the image size is given as Height × Width). The gray
value of the h × w pixels of the block (computed using
the (8 − t) MSBs only) is denoted by pk1, pk2, . . . , pkh×w. The
authentication data of the kth block can be computed as
H
(
ID‖SK‖Height‖Width‖k‖pk1‖pk2‖ · · · ‖pkh×w
)
= (dk1 ,dk2 , . . . ,dku),
(4)
where the symbol ‖ is the concatenation of all input streams.
Notably, according to the discussion in [12], the image
identification number ID and the block sequence number k
are two important parameters for resisting the collage attack
[15].
Finally, because each pixel within a block only has t
LSBs to be embedded, each block might have insuﬃcient
embedding space for embedding the recovery data and the
160-bit authentication data. In this case, the bit stream of
the authentication data needs to be folded, that is, converted
into another shorter bit stream. In the folding procedure, the
Region I
1 2 3 . . .
Region II
1 2 3 . . .
Region IV
1 2 3 . . .
Region III
1 2 3 . . .
Figure 2: An example of region division and number assignment.
length of the embedding authentication data δ is determined
by






The original bit stream generated by (4) is then divided
equally into several sections of δ bits each and folded into
δ-bit embedding authentication data with an exclusive or
operation. For example, a bit stream “10100111” can be
folded into “1101”, since 1101 = 1010 ⊕ 0111. In this case,
δ = 4; “1010” is the first section of the original bit stream,
and “0111” is the last section of the original bit stream. If the
last section does not have enough bits, then it is padded with
“0” to make it convenient to fold.
3.3. The embedding procedure
Finally, as shown in Figure 1(a), the recovery and the
authentication data of a given image are combined to
form the embedding watermark. This section describes the
procedure that embeds the watermark. First, the image is
divided equally into (n + 1) nonoverlapping big regions,
where n is a number not less than the threshold value r. The
block addresses {1, 2, 3, . . .} are assigned to the blocks of each
region according to the raster scan order, that is, from left to
right and top to bottom. The n index shares of each block are
then embedded, respectively, into the blocks, which are in the
corresponding positions of the other n regions. For example,
assuming that r = 2 and n = 3, then, as shown in Figure 2, the
image is divided equally into n + 1 = 3 + 1 nonoverlapping
regions, and numbers are assigned sequentially to the blocks
of each region by raster scan order. According to Section 3.1,
the VQ index value of the first block in Region I is shared
among n = 3 index shares, which are embedded into the first
block in the remaining n = 3 regions (Regions II, III, and
IV), respectively. Likewise, the three index shares of the first
block in Region II are embedded into the first block in the
remaining n = 3 regions (Regions III, IV, and I), respectively.
Similar action is performed for each block in each region.
On the other hand, each block has its own authentication
data for verification purpose, according to Section 3.2. The
authentication data of a block are embedded into the block
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itself. Therefore, the data to be embedded into each block
include its own authentication data and the n index shares
obtained from the corresponding block of the remaining n
regions (one share per region). To simplify the embedding,
the concatenation operation is used to combine these n index
shares and the authentication data to form a watermark for
the block. The watermark is then transformed into a binary
stream and is embedded into the t LSBs of the pixels in
the block. To increase security level, the MT pseudorandom
number generator [19] may also be integrated into the
embedding procedure to confuse the embedding positions
of the binary stream, as illustrated below using the afore-
mentioned example (r = 2 and n = 3). Assume that the
embedding watermark has 27 bits, which consist of n = 3
index shares (b0–b4, b5–b9 and b10–b14) and a set of local
authentication data (b15–b26). This watermark is embedded
into the t = 3 LSBs of the block with a size of 3 × 3.
Figure 3(a) shows the positions of the 3 × 3 = 9 pixels in the
block. The 3 LSBs of the nine pixels in the block provide a
hiding space of 27 bits, which are assigned position numbers
0–26, as shown in Figure 3(b). Inputting a randomly chosen
32-bit natural number, called the “seed”, into the MT
pseudorandom number generator [19], generates a series
of pseudorandom real numbers Rj ( j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 219937
−1), which are uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1].
After a simple mapping (the detail is omitted), we get a
pseudorandom sequence whose elements are integers from
0 to 26. The embedding binary stream is then embedded
into the corresponding locations in the block according to
the pseudorandom integer sequence. For example, if the
generated pseudorandom embedding sequence for 0–26 is
{21, 4, 26, 13, 6, 9, 0, 25, 13, 14, 22, 3, 16, 2, 17, 18, 5, 19,
7, 20, 8, 11, 1, 23, 15, 24, 10}, then the bit b0 of the binary
stream watermark is embedded in the bit-position marked
as number 21 in Figure 3(b), and the bit b1 is embedded
in the bit-position marked as number 4 in Figure 3(b), and
similarly along the entire sequence. Figure 3(c) shows the
result of embedding the 27-bit watermark b in this example.
The watermarked image is obtained by performing the
embedding procedure block by block until the entire image is
processed. The seed used in the MT pseudorandom number
generator [19] can be the secret key (SK) in (4), and only the
legal users who own the same secret key can obtain the same
pseudorandom embedding sequence to verify correctly the
authenticity and integrity of the image.
4. THE PROPOSED METHOD (DECODING)
4.1. Verification
In the verification phase, the query image is first divided into
nonoverlapping blocks of h × w pixels, and the verification
is performed block by block until all blocks are processed.
The watermark of each query block is extracted from the t
LSBs of each of its h × w pixels. Notably, only legal users
know (the codebook and) the parameters used earlier in the
watermark embedding procedure. Legal users can obtain the
previously used pseudorandom embedding sequence from
the secret key SK and thus obtain the authentication data
and recovery data from the extracted watermark, according
to the locations corresponding to the obtained sequence.
The authentication data “extracted” this way using the t
LSBs of the query block’s pixels should be the same as
the authentication data “recomputed” directly from the
(8-t) MSBs of the block’s pixels, with the recomputation
as described in the two paragraphs containing (4) and
(5). A block in which the extracted authentication data
coincide with the recomputed authentication data is called
an authentic block; otherwise, it is regarded as a tampered
block. An authentic block is one that almost certainly has
no tampering occurs, and the recovery data embedded in
this block are trustworthy for reconstructing other blocks in
the recovery phase, if other blocks are tampered. In contrast,
a block that fails the authentication test is regarded as a
tampered block, and the backup content stored in it should
never be trusted, that is, should not be used to reconstruct
other blocks in the later recovery phase.
Because the hiding capacity is not enough to hide the
whole hashed sequence, a folding procedure is performed to
shorten the hashed sequence. This procedure is a many-to-
one mapping (2160 to 2δ), leading to the possibility that two
hashed sequences have the same folded sequence. (A smaller
δ value leads to a higher collision probability.) However,
experiments results show that the folded sequence can locate
almost all tampered places when δ = 11 bits (see Figures
6(d)–6(f) and 7(d)–7(f)).
Moreover, to reduce the probability of misdetection
resulting from collision, a hierarchical check system can
be used to locate the tampered area. In other words, each
authentic block can be checked again after performing the
verification procedure described in Section 4.1. If the eight
neighboring blocks of an authentic block are marked as
tampered blocks, then the block status can be changed
from authentic to tampered because a collision might have
occurred in the block. This block is then recovered by
recovery data, which can still yield an acceptable look for this
block, even if no collision occurred.
4.2. Recovery of tampered area
The recovery phase starts if any tampered block is found
by the block authentication step. For a tampered block, we
collect its backup data, which are the n VQ index value shares
embedded in the n corresponding blocks of other n regions
(one share per region, see Section 3.3), to reconstruct the
VQ index value of the block. Of course, some of these n
backup blocks might also be marked as “tampered” after
the authentication test in Section 4.1. These tampered, and
hence useless, backup blocks are simply skipped. The VQ
index value of the tampered block can be traced back by
inverse sharing if at least r (out of the n) VQ index value
shares survive. The tampered block can then be rebuilt by
this VQ index value and the codebook.
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
This section presents the experimental results and compar-
ison to demonstrate the performance and feasibility of the
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Figure 3: An example of embedding a 27-bit watermark b in a 3 × 3 block: (a) the arrangement of the 9 pixels, (b) the arrangement for the
3-LSBs of the 9 pixels, (c) the result of embedding.
proposed method. All images were 8-bit gray valued, and the
VQ codebook was generated by the LBG algorithm [30]. Each
block had 4 × 4 pixels, and a set of 512 × 512 standard gray-
value images was used as the training set to generate the VQ
codebook. The (r = 2, n = 3) threshold sharing scheme was
used to share the VQ index values. The image was divided
equally into n + 1 = 4 nonoverlapping regions according to
Section 3.3, and the parameter t became t = 2 by (2) when L =
16,384 and h × w = 4 × 4, which means that the watermark
was embedded in the t = 2 least significant bits of each pixel
of the image.
Figure 4 shows the four original images “Lena,” “Jet,”
“Baboon,” and “Barbara”. Each image was 512 × 512.
Figure 5 shows their watermarked version, after executing the
proposed watermarking method described in Section 3. The
qualities of all watermarked images and recovery images were
measured by the peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR), defined
as




in which MSE denotes the mean square error between
the pixel values of the original and of the watermarked
images. From Figure 5, we can see that the qualities of the
watermarked images are acceptable. Their PSNR values are
all greater than 44.13 dB. The images in Figures 4(a)–4(d)
and 5(a)– 5(d) are visually indistinguishable using naked
eyes. In other words, the proposed watermarking method
has transparency property (the watermark is perceptually
invisible).
Experiments were performed to tamper with the water-
marked images shown in Figure 5 to measure the perfor-
mance of the proposed method in tampering detection,
location, and recovery.
5.1. Cropping attacks
A part of each watermarked image was cropped. Figure 6(a)
shows the watermarked image Lena(W) with 25% of the
image cropped. Figures 6(b) and 6(c) show the same
image with 50% of the image cropped. The cropped parts
were detected by the verification procedure described in
Section 4.1, as shown in Figure 6(d)–6(f), where the black
blocks are the detected tampered blocks, and the white blocks
are the detected authentic blocks. Finally, Figures 6(g)–6(i)
show the recovery results obtained by applying the recovery
techniques in Section 4.2 on the images Figures 6(a)–6(c),
respectively (using the white blocks in Figures 6(d)–6(f) to
recover the black blocks). The PSNR values between the
recovery images in Figures 6(g)–6(i) and the original images
in Figures 6(a)–6(c) were 40.04 dB, 34.77 dB, and 36.54 dB,
respectively. In summary, the cropped portions were cor-
rectly detected and located, and the cropped portions were
recovered although the cropped portions occupied a big area
of the watermarked image in both Figures 6(b) and 6(c).
5.2. Collage attacks
As reviewed in Section 1, a block-based watermarking
scheme may be vulnerable to a collage attack [15]. Therefore,
an experiment was performed to verify the eﬀectiveness of
the proposed scheme against a collage attack. To perform
collage attack, several authentic blocks were collected from
a set of watermarked images to forma “forgery” codebook
as used in collage attack. Figure 7(a) shows a tampered
watermarked image “Lena(W)” (Figure 5(a)), in which a
flower (formed of blocks chosen from forgery codebook,
i.e., blocks chosen from another watermarked image) is
inserted into her hat. Similarly, Figure 7(b) shows a tampered
watermarked image “Jet(W)” (Figure 5(b)), in which the
country name “U.S.” and the emblem printed on the plane
are replaced, respectively, by the country name “R.O.C.”
and another emblem. Finally, Figure 7(c) shows a tampered
watermarked image “Barbara(W)” (Figure 5(d)), in which
a part of the bookshelf in the top-left corner is removed
by copying some blocks of the same watermarked image.
Figures 7(d), 7(e), and 7(f), respectively, show the detection
results of the tampered images, and Figures 7(g), 7(h),
and 7(i), respectively, show the recovery results, of which
the PSNR values were 41.58 dB, 42.45 dB, and 43.01 dB,
respectively. The experiment results indicate that the pro-
posed method accurately detected and located the replaced
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Figure 4: Four original images: (a) Lena , (b) Jet, (c) Baboon, (d) Barbara.
parts and recovered back the replaced parts with acceptable
quality. Additionally, inserting the block index k and the
image identification ID in the authentication data helped




A security-enhanced approach can be used to increase the
security level. In this new model, the image is divided equally
into at least n + 1 nonoverlapping regions. Then, for each
block, the block’s n VQ index value shares are embedded
into n blocks chosen from n of the remaining regions (one
corresponding block per mentioned region). However, the
positions of the corresponding blocks in each region can be
randomized and made distinct among regions. Therefore,
the MT pseudorandom number generator [19] could be
applied to perform this rearrangement.
6.2. Comparison
Because the proposed scheme is a watermarking-based
approach with detecting locating and recovery abili-
ties of tampered areas, Table 1 compares it with other
watermarking-based methods that have the same functions.
The data in Table 1 indicate that the proposed scheme
is competitive. The qualities of our watermarked images are
competitive to the counterparts obtained in those elegant
methods reported in literature. Because the PSNR values of
the watermarked images in [10] and the recovered images
in [10, 13] are not shown in the published papers [10,
13], they are denoted by the symbol “N/A (not available)”.
Although the PSNR value of the watermarked images of
[10] is not shown in their published paper, the value must
be very high, since the halftone information is embedded
by 1-LSB (in the worst case, even if the LSB bit of each
pixel is altered, the PSNR is still higher than 48 dB). Even
so, their recovered images were still slightly worse than
those obtained by the proposed method, as shown in
Figure 8 (where Figures 8(b) and 8(e) are from [10, page
168] and [13, page 157], resp.). Additionally, Figures 8(g)–
8(h) show the experimental result of [14]. Clearly, the lost
upper 25% of the image recovered by [14] (Figure 8(h))
contains more distortion than that of the proposed method
(Figure 8(i)).
To measure the performance of tampering recovery, the
qualities of the recovered images were compared with those
published methods when the same area was cropped from
the watermarked images of both sides. From Table 1 and
Figure 8, we can see that the quality of the recovered image
in the proposed method is better than that of the published
methods. This is because their schemes can recover the
tampered parts of the protected image by using the recovery
data, which is often embedded in blocks of other areas of
the same image. Therefore, a block and its backup block
may both be tampered at the same time if a watermarked
image is tampered extensively in a large area and randomly.
In this case, the recovery ability of the tampered block in
many approaches is gone. In contrast to the aforementioned
approach (which uses a backup block to store the recover
data), the recovery data of a block in the proposed method
are the n “shares” of the block’s VQ index value, which are
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 5: The watermarked images of Figure 4: (a) Lena(W) (PSNR = 44.14 dB), (b) Jet(W) (PSNR = 44.13 dB), (c) Baboon(W) (PSNR =
44.15 dB), and (d) Barbara(W) (PSNR = 44.15 dB).
Table 1: A comparison between the reported recovery methods and the proposed method. (“∗” means “quoted directly from the reported
paper”, and “N/A” means not mentioned in the reported paper). The unit of PSNR is the dB.
Method
Abilities to detect PSNR of the PSNR of the
and locate tampering watermarked image recovered image
[9] Yes 44.37∗ (Beach 256 × 256) 30.85∗ (cropping 7.1%)
[14] Yes 42.11∗ (Lena 256× 256) 30.14
∗ (cropping 12.5%)
25.39∗ (Figure 8(h) where cropping is 25%)
44.15 (Beach 256 × 256) 42.44 (cropping 7.1%)
44.15 (Lena 256 × 256) 41.28 (cropping 12.5%)
38.81 (Figure 8(i) where cropping is 25%)
Ours Yes 43.20 (cropping 6%)
44.14 (Lena 512 × 512) 34.77 or 36.54 (Figure 6(h) or Figure 6(i),
resp.; each cropping is 50%)
43.27 (cropping 6%)
44.13 (Jet 512 × 512) 34.34 or 36.07 (if crop 50%
like Figure 6(b) or Figure 6(c) does)
[10] Yes N/A N/A (but see Figure 8(b))
[13] Yes 34.34∗ (Lena 512 × 512) N/A (but see Figure 8(e))
embedded into blocks located in n other nonoverlapping
regions of the image. (Notably, instead of directly embedding
the recovery data, the proposed method shares the data
and spreads the n shares throughout the whole image. The
scattering of the n shares in the whole image reduces the
chance that all VQ index value shares are lost when a
connected portion of the image is damaged.) With sharing
(and the scattering in the whole image), the tampered query
block can still be recovered even if only r out of the n
backup blocks of a tampered query block survive in an attack.
This increases the recovery rate of the proposed method, as
compared with those methods in which each query block
only has one backup block. Thus, the proposed scheme can
handle the case in which a large area is tampered even if 50%




Figure 6: The cropping attack experiments: (a) 25% of the watermarked image Lena(W) is cropped; (b) a vertical cropping of 50%; (c)
a horizontal cropping of 50%; (d)–(f) the detected tampered blocks of (a)–(c), respectively; (g)–(i) the images recovered from (a)–(c),
respectively. The PSNR values are 40.04 dB for (g); 34.77 dB for (h); and 36.54 dB for (i).
of the watermarked image is cropped, as long as r out of the
n backup blocks are authentic.
To make a fair comparison with published methods,
Table 2 shows the compression ratio, amount of the recovery
data, and preservation system of each method. The com-
pression ratio is the ratio of the recovery data size to the
original data size. For a 256 × 256 host image, because
[9] stores the 6-bit mean value of each 2 × 2 block, its
compression ratio is (2 × 2 × 8)/6 = 5.33. Moreover,
[9] uses only one backup to preserve the recovery data
and thus has ((256 × 256)/(2 × 2)) × 6 = 98,304 bits
of recovery data, which are embedded in the 2-LSB of
the watermarked image. (The recovery data of a block is
preserved in another block whose address is determined
by a permutation function.) Consequently, the block and
its backup block could be tampered simultaneously if the
watermarked image is tampered extensively in a large area
and randomly. In this case, the recovery of the block fails.
Lin et al. [9] found that the recovery rate was not higher
than 94% when the cropping area occupies 50% of the
watermarked image. In contrast, the proposed method had a
recovery rate of 100%. In [14], Wang and Tsai preserved the
recovery data of ROI (regions of importance) and embedded
them in the host image. In their experiments, because the size
of the so-called range block was 4 × 4, and the codes of each
range block were 31 bits, the compression ratio is (4 × 4 ×




Figure 7: The collage attack experiments: (a) a tampered version of Lena(W); (b) a tampered version of Jet(W); (c) a tampered version of
Barbara(W), respectively; (g)–(i) the images recovered from (a)–(c), respectively. The PSNR values are 41.58 dB for (g); 42.45 dB for (h); and
43.01 dB for (i).
8)/31 = 4.13. Their scheme also uses a backup approach to
preserve the recovery data. Hence, if the range of ROI is about
60% of the host image, then ((256× 256)/(4× 4))× 31× 0.6
= 76,186 bits are embedded in the 256 × 256 watermarked
image. The recovery ability is good in the ROI, but slightly
worse in the non-ROI area, because the tampered non-ROI
area is recovered using image inpainting technique. Luo et
al. [10] used a binary halftone image with the same size
(512 × 512) as the gray-valued host image as the recovery
data, thus yielding a compression ratio of 8. Therefore, their
recovery data have 512 × 512 × 1 = 262,144 bits. Because
their method has a small amount of embedding data, its
watermarked image quality is good, but the recovery ability
is not good enough to resist cropping attack of an extensive
area. Wu and Chang’s method [13] backs up three copies
of the recovery data, which are the results of edge detection
(one bit per group of 4× 4 pixels). The compression ratio
is (4 × 4 × 8)/1 = 128, and recovery data size is ((512 ×
512)/(4 × 4)) × 3 = 49,152 bits. The advantage of [13] is
that the resulting image is a JPEG-compressed image and
can be used directly in transmission. However, the recovered
image is slightly worse than the proposed method because
the recovery data are the result of edge detection.
Our experiments used a codebook with 16 384 code-
words to encode each 4 × 4 block, and hence the index value
of each block had (log216384) = 14 bits. The compression




Figure 8: A comparison of the recovered images of [10, 13, 14] and the proposed method, with tampering or cropping in the same region:
(a) 25% of a 512 × 512 watermarked image Barbara(W) is replaced; (b) the recovered image of [10]; (c) the recovered image of the proposed
method; (d) 25% of a 512 × 512 watermarked image Lena(W) is cropped; (e) the recovered image of [13]; (f) the recovered image of the
proposed method; (g) 25% of a 256 × 256 watermarked image Lena(W) is cropped; (h) the recovered image of [14]; (i) the recovered image
of the proposed method.
rate was (4 × 4 × 8)/log216384 = 9.14. After (r = 2, n = 3)
threshold sharing, each block’s VQ index had three index
shares, so each share had (log2L)/r = (log216384)/2 = 7
bits. The total amount of recovery data was ((512× 512)/(4×
4)) × 7 × 3 = 344 064 bits for a 512 × 512 image (or
((256 × 256)/(4 × 4)) × 7 × 3 = 86 016 bits for a 256 × 256
image).
In general, the recovery ability is related to the amount of
the recovery data embedded in the protected image. In case
of 256 × 256 host images, the amount of recovery data in
our method was 86 016 bits after (2, 3) threshold sharing
(57 344 bits before sharing) and was 98 304 and 76 186 bits in
[9, 14], respectively. Although our method did not have the
largest data size, its recovery ability was most competitive.
This is because the (r, n) threshold sharing (Section 3.1) and
the wide scatter manner (Section 3.3) were used to scatter the
recovery data in a distributed and missing allowable manner.
In case of 512 × 512 host images, our recovery data
had 344 064 bits after sharing (229 376 bits before sharing),
while [10, 13] had 262 144 and 49 152 bits, respectively.
The proposed method had a larger data size than [10, 13],
so it is not surprising that our recovery quality is better
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Table 2: Comparison of the size of recovery data.
Method
Compression ratio (C.R.) Total amount of the recovery data Manner of preserving
of the recovery data (counting the copies) the recovery data
[9]
Represent each 2 × 2 block by 6 bits
((256 × 256)/(2 × 2)) × 6 = 98, 304 bits Backup in another block
C.R. = (2 × 2 × 8)/6 = 5.33
[10]
Represent each pixel by one bit
512 × 512 = 262,144 bits Backup in another pixel
C.R. = 8
[13]
Represent each 4 × 4 block by 1 bit
((512 × 512)/(4 × 4)) × 3 = 49,152 bits Three backup copies of the recovery
C.R. = (4 × 4 × 8)/1 = 128 data are embedded in another 3 blocks
[14]
Represent each 4 × 4 block by 31 bits
((256 × 256)/(4 × 4)) × 31 × 0.6 = 76,186 bits Backup in another block
C.R. = (4 × 4 × 8)/31 = 4.13
For 256× 256 image:
Before sharing:
((256 × 256)/(4 × 4)) × 14 = 57,344 bits
After (2, 3) sharing:
Represent each × 4 block by 14 bits ((256 × 256)/(4 × 4)) × (14/2) × 3 = 86,016 bits n shares are embedded in
Ours C.R. = (4 × 4 × 8/14) = 9.14 For 512× 512 image: blocks of n distinct regions
Before sharing:
((512 × 512)/(4 × 4)) × 14 = 229,376 bits
After (2, 3) sharing:
((512 × 512)/(4 × 4)) × (14/2) × 3 = 344,064 bits
than [10, 13] (see Figure 8). Nonetheless, because the (r, n)
threshold sharing was used to distribute the more detailed
recovery data, the total size of all n shares for a VQ index was
only n × (log2L)/r bits (3 × 7 = 21 bits), rather than n ×
L ( = 3 × 14 = 42) bits as used in the traditional approach,
in which n = 3 copies of the recovery data are made directly.
This is why the watermarked image of our method still has
a good PSNR (44.1 dB) quality, after embedding the detailed
recovery data.
Some negative properties of the proposed scheme should
be mentioned as follows.
(a) The codebook used in the VQ compression proce-
dure must be available during tamper detection and
recovery. (This codebook can be public.)
(b) The legal receiver must know the parameters used in
the encoding procedure, that is, the values of r, n, SK,
image size (Height and Width), and block size.
(c) Due to the collision of the hashed sequence, a
nonsecure pass (in which a tampered block is treated
as authentic block) might occur. A hierarchical check
system (see the ending paragraph of Section 4.1) can
avoid this problem, but it creates the chance of false
alarm (in which a nontampered block is considered
as a tampered block). Nonetheless, the misalarmed
block is replaced by its recovery data, which can still
yield an acceptable look for this block, since our
recovery data cover enough information about the
block.
6.3. Security analysis of the recovery data
If an image block is marked as tampered, then the recovery
data embedded in it can no longer be used for recovery.
Let us discuss the situation when an attack damages an
extensive area of the watermarked image. It suﬃces to use
Figure 8(a) or Figure 8(g), where the damaged area is one
horizontal quarter of the image, as an example to show how
to analyze the recovery rate of the proposed method. The (r,
n) threshold is (2, 3) in Figure 8; hence, to recover a block B
in the damaged area needs any r = 2 of its n = 3 index shares
distributed in other three regions (i.e., Regions II, III, and IV,
if block B is in Region I).
The recovery rate of the proposed method is 100% for
Figure 8(a) or Figure 8(g), because two of the four regions
{I–IV} are never touched (see the four regions shown in
Figure 2), which means that two authentic shares required
to rebuild block B can always be obtained from these two
untouched regions. Therefore, some attackers might try to
scratch an area across all Regions I–IV, but they can only
achieve this when they know how the image was partitioned
into (n + 1) regions. (An image can be partitioned into four
regions in many ways besides the one shown in Figure 2;
e.g., Region I could be a long vertical bar in the leftmost
quarter, with Regions II, III, and IV obtained by dividing
the remaining area into three horizontal bars. Notably, the
number of possible partitions increases significantly if each
region itself is allowed to be an unconnected set.) To continue
the analysis, still assume the partition of regions is as in
Figure 2.
Then, even if the scratched horizontal quarter belt (the
dark area in Figure 9(a)) happens to touch all four regions, a
tampered block B can still be recovered as long as r = 2 of the
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Figure 9: Analysis of 25% horizontal cropping for a 512 × 12
image. Dark area is tampered.
n = 3 support (recovery) shares are in the remaining 75% of
the image (i.e., the white part in Figure 9(a)). The recovery
rates are distinct between the lower pixels (intersection of
dark area with Regions III and IV) and the upper pixels
(intersection of dark area with Regions I and II) of the
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for each upper pixel. For the dark quarter belt shown in
Figure 9(a), there are 512/4 = 128 rows of pixels. Among
them, x rows of the dark pixels are in the upper plane,
and (128−x) rows are in the lower plane. Therefore, in


















after certain evaluations. Now, as the value of x varies from
0 through 128, the average probability to recover a dark area
pixel is the integration of the above equation on the range
from x = 0 to x = 128, followed by a division over the range
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Finally, consider that there are 1/3 = 33.3% (or 2/3 =
66.6%) chances that the quarter belt will (will not) cross all
four regions {I–IV}; the recovery rate of a tampered pixel for













To see why there exists 1/3 = 33.3% chance that the quarter
belt will cross all four regions {I–IV}, we can use Figure 9(b)
to explain. It is obvious that if the dark horizontal belt
gradually goes through the whole 512 × 512 image from
bottom to top, with the constraint that the whole belt must
stay in the image, then the upper boundary of the 128-row
dark belt goes from the y-coordinate value 127 through 511
(assuming that the lowest line of the image has coordinate y
= 0). Obviously, the quarter belt will touch all four regions
{I–IV} when the dark belt’s top row hits the 512 × 512
image’s y = 256 line (y = 257, y = 258, . . . , y = 382, or y
= 256 + 128 − 1 = 383). Therefore, the probability that all
four regions {I–IV} are touched by the belt is (383 − 256 +
1)/(511− 127 + 1) ≈ 1/3.
Below we discuss how we got the formulas for PL and
PU above. Without the loss of generality, we only prove the
formula for PL. Because of the symmetry (left versus right),
we may assume that the damaged block B is in Region IV,
as shown in Figure 9(a). (The recovery rate for the case that
block B is in Region III is identical to the recovery rate for the
case that B is in Region IV.) Now, as stated earlier, block B can
be recovered as long as any r = 2 of its n = 3 supporting shares
(stored in {Regions I, II, III}, resp.) are in the white part of
Figure 9(a). Now, according to sequences I, II, III, there are
four subcases; this requirement is satisfied. They are (Dark,
White, White), (White, Dark, White), (White, White, Dark),
and (White, White, White). For example, (Dark, White,
White) means that the supporting share in Region I is in dark
area, but the supporting shares in Region II and III are both
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(256)3 − (256)2x + 512x2 − 2x3].
(13)
The analysis for PU is similar. Notably, increasing the value
of n increases the recovery rate for a fixed r but reduces the
PSNR quality of the watermarked image.
6.4. Recovery in case of multiple users
The method described in Sections 3 and 4 can be regarded as
a recovery work for a single user who owns the image. The
recovery data of the image is uniformly embedded into the
protected image itself. A single user can perform the recovery
work alone.
On the other hand, the case of multiple users can also
be considered. For example, consider a case where a team
of four members have to produce a new product according
to its blueprint. First, divide the blueprint into (n + 1 =
3 + 1 = 4) nonoverlapping regions as shown in Figure 2,
and each member holds one region. Then, for each 4× 4
block of Region I, use (r = 2, n = 3) sharing to generate
n = 3 index shares (recovery data) and embed, respectively,
the three index shares in other regions (i.e., Regions II, III,
and IV). Perform the analogous process for each block of
each region. By this, each member knows nothing about the
complete look of the new product and thus cannot leak the
information to a competitor. On the other hand, if one of
the four members is absent in the team meeting, then the
region held by the absent member can still be reconstructed
through the mutual support of other members. The recovery
procedure is similar to Section 4.2. In fact, since r = 2, any
two of the four members (e.g., members I and II) can meet
together to handle the team work by roughly reconstructing
the other two quarter images owned by the other two team
members (III and IV) in order to review the approximated
look of the whole product.
The compression ratio of the recovery data in this
multiple-users case is (4 × 4 × 8)/log216384 = 9.14. If one
member transmits the recovery data of the absent region to
another member, for instance, in the previous example (r =
2, n = 3), if member I wants to transmit data to member II
in order to help member II to construct Region III), then the
amount of transmitted data is ((512 × 512)/(4 × 4) × 7) ×
(1/4) = 28,672 bits for a 512 × 512 blueprint. Of course,
this amount is doubled if member I wants to help member
II to build up both Regions III and IV. On the other hand,
each member holds the recovery data of other three regions,
which are embedded in the held region, and the total data
size is [((512 × 512)/(4 × 4) × 7) × (1/4)] × 3 = 86,016
bits. Anyway, we can increase the application of the proposed
method by the mutual cooperation of multiple users. In the
above (r = 2, n = 3) case, the recovery work is performed by
any two team members instead of a single user.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The study proposes a watermarking method for image
authentication, and it is with good self-recovery ability. The
proposed method has the following functions: (1) detecting
whether the watermarked image is tampered, (2) indicating
the locations of the tampered area, (3) self-recovering the
tampered portion using the nontampered portion of the
same watermarked image, and (4) enhancing the recovery
ability by utilizing (r, n) threshold sharing [18], followed by
scattering the shares all over the image.
Feature (4) above gives the proposed method a good
recovery rate. The sharing polynomial of Thien and Lin’s
method [18], which was devised to share a secret image
among several participants, is used to reduce the amount
of recovery data without significantly degrading the visual
quality of the watermarked image. Experimental results
(Figures 5–8) and the comparison Tables 1 and 2 show that
the proposed method is competitive.
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